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Abstract
We study the problem of truthfully scheduling 푚 tasks to 푛 selfish unrelated machines, under
the objective of makespan minimization, as was introduced in the seminal work of Nisan and Ro-
nen [STOC’99]. Closing the current gap of [2.618, 푛] on the approximation ratio of deterministic
truthful mechanisms is a notorious open problem in the field of algorithmic mechanism design.
We provide the first such improvement in more than a decade, since the lower bounds of 2.414
(for 푛 = 3) and 2.618 (for 푛 → ∞) by Christodoulou et al. [SODA’07] and Koutsoupias and Vidali
[MFCS’07], respectively. More specifically, we show that the currently best lower bound of 2.618
can be achieved even for just 푛 = 4 machines; for 푛 = 5 we already get the first improvement,
namely 2.711; and allowing the number of machines to grow arbitrarily large we can get a lower
bound of 2.755.
1 Introduction
Truthful scheduling of unrelated parallel machines is a prototypical problem in algorithmic mechanism
design, introduced in the seminal paper of Nisan and Ronen [NR99] that essentially initiated this field
of research. It is an extension of the classical combinatorial problem for the makespan minimization
objective (see, e.g., [Vaz03, Ch. 17] or [Hal97, Sec. 1.4]), with the added twist that now machines are
rational, strategic agents that would not hesitate to lie about their actual processing times for each job,
if this can reduce their personal cost, i.e., their own completion time. The goal is to design a scheduling
mechanism, using payments as incentives for the machines to truthfully report their true processing
costs, that allocates all jobs in order to minimize the makespan, i.e., the maximum completion time
across machines.
Nisan and Ronen [NR01] showed right away that no such truthful deterministic mechanism can
achieve an approximation better than 2 to the optimum makespan; this is true even for just 푛 = 2
machines. It is worth emphasizing that this lower bound is not conditioned on any computational
complexity assumptions; it is purely a direct consequence of the added truthfulness requirement and
holds even for mechanisms that have unbounded computational capabilities. It is interesting to com-
pare this with the classical (i.e., non-strategic) algorithmic setting where we do know [LST90] that a
2-approximate polynomial-time algorithm does exist and that it is NP-hard to approximate the mini-
mum makespan within a factor smaller than 32 . On the positive side, it is also shown in [NR01] that the
mechanism that myopically allocates each job to the machine with the fastest reported time for it, and
compensates her with a payment equal to the report of the second-fastest machine, achieves an approx-
imation ratio of 푛 (where 푛 is the number of machines); this mechanism is truthful and corresponds to
the paradigmatic VCG mechanism (see, e.g., [Nis07]).
Based on these, Nisan and Ronen [NR01, Conjecture 4.9] made the bold conjecture that their upper
bound of 푛 is actually the tight answer to the approximation ratio of deterministic scheduling; more
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than 20 years after the first conference version of their paper [NR99] though, very little progress has
been made in closing their gap of [2, 푛]. Thus, the Nisan-Ronen conjecture remains up to this day one
of the most important open questions in algorithmic mechanism design. Christodoulou et al. [CKV07]
improved the lower bound to 1+√2 ≈ 2.414, even for instanceswith only 푛 = 3machines and, soon after,
Koutsoupias and Vidali [KV07] showed that by allowing 푛 → ∞ the lower bound can be increased to
1 + 휙 ≈ 2.618. The journal versions of these papers can be found at [CKV09] and [KV13], respectively.
In our paper we provide the first improvement on this lower bound in well over a decade.
Another line of work tries to provide better lower bounds by imposing further assumptions on the
mechanism, in addition to truthfulness. Most notably, Ashlagi et al. [ADL12] were actually able to
resolve the Nisan-Ronen conjecture for the important special case of anonymous mechanisms, by pro-
viding a lower bound of 푛. The same can be shown for mechanisms with strongly-monotone allocation
rules [MS18, Sec. 3.2] and for mechanism with additive or local payment rules [NR01, Sec. 4.3.3].
Better bounds have also been achieved by modifying the scheduling model itself. For example,
Lavi and Swamy [LS09] showed that if the processing times of all jobs can take only two values (“high”
and “low”) then there exists a 2-approximate truthful mechanism; they also give a lower bound of 1110 .
Very recently, Christodoulou et al. [CKK19] showed a lower bound of 훺(√푛) for a slightly generalized
model where the completion times of machines are allowed to be submodular functions (of the cost of
the jobs assigned to them) instead of additive in the standard setting.
Although in this paper we focus exclusively on deterministic mechanisms, randomization is also
of great interest and has attracted a significant amount of attention [NR01, MS18, Yu09], in particular
the two-machine case [LY08b, LY08a, Lu09, CDZ15, KV19]. The currently best general lower bound on
the approximation ratio of randomized (universally) truthful mechanisms is 2 − 1
푛
[MS18], while the
upper one is 0.837푛 [LY08a]. For themore relaxed notion of truthfulness in expectation, the upper bound
is 푛+52 [LY08b]. Related to the randomized case is also the fractional model, where mechanisms (but
also the optimum makespan itself) are allowed to split jobs among machines. For this case, [CKK10]
prove lower and upper bounds of 2 − 1푛 and 푛+12 , respectively; the latter is also shown to be tight for
task-independent mechanisms.
Other variants of the strategic unrelated machine scheduling problem that have been studied in-
clude the Bayesian model [CHMS13, DW15, GK17] (where job costs are drawn from probability distri-
butions), scheduling without payments [Kou14, GKK19] or with verification [NR01, PV14, Ven14], and
strategic behaviour beyond (dominant-strategy) truthfulness [FRGL19]. The related machines model,
which is essentially a single-dimensional mechanism design variant of our problem, has of course also
been well-studied (see, e.g., [AT01, DDDR11, APPP09]) and a deterministic PTAS exists [CK13].
1.1 Our Results and Techniques
We present new lower bounds on the approximation ratio of deterministic truthful mechanisms for
the prototypical problem of scheduling unrelated parallel machines, under the makespanminimization
objective, introduced in the seminal work of Nisan and Ronen [NR01]. Our main result (Theorem 2)
is a bound of 휌 ≈ 2.755, where 휌 is the solution of the cubic equation (7). This improves upon the
lower bound of 1 + 휙 ≈ 2.618 by Koutsoupias and Vidali [KV13] which appeared well over a decade
ago [KV07]. Similar to [KV13], we use an instance with a number of machines growing arbitrarily
large (푛 → ∞).
Furthermore, our construction (see Section 3.4) provides improved lower bounds also pointwise, as
a function of the number of machines 푛 that we are allowed to use. More specifically, for 푛 = 3 we
recover the bound of 1 +
√
2 ≈ 2.414 by [CKV09]. For 푛 = 4 we can already match the 2.618 bound
that [KV13] could achieve only in the limit as 푛 → ∞. The first strict improvement, namely 2.711,
comes from 푛 = 5. As the number of machines grows, our bound converges to 2.755. Our results are
summarized in Table 1.
A central feature of our approach is the formulation of our lower bound as the solution to a (non-
linear) optimization programme (NLP); we then provide optimal, analytic solutions to it for all values
of 푛 ≥ 3 (Lemma 3). It is important to clarify here that, in principle, just giving feasible solutions to
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푛 3 4 5 6 7 8 … ∞
Previous work 2.414 2.465 2.534 2.570 2.590 2.601 … 2.618
This paper 2.414 2.618 2.711 2.739 2.746 2.750 … 2.755
Table 1: Lower bounds on the approximation ratio of deterministic scheduling, as a function of the number of machines 푛,
given by our Theorem 2 (bottom line). The previous state-of-the-art is given on the line above and first appeared in [CKV07]
(푛 = 3) and [KV07] (푛 ≥ 4). The case with 푛 = 2 machines was completely resolved in [NR99], with an approximation ratio
of 2.
this programme would still suffice to provide valid lower bounds for our problem. However, the fact
that we pin down and use the actual optimal ones gives rise to an interesting implication: our lower
bounds are provably the best ones that can be derived using our construction.
There are two key elements that allow us to derive our improved bounds, compared to the approach
in previous related works [CKV09, KV13]. First, we deploy the weak-monotonicity (Theorem 1) char-
acterization of truthfulness in a slightly more delicate way; see Lemma 1. This gives us better control
and flexibility in considering deviating strategies for the machines (see our case-analysis in Section 3).
Secondly, we consider more involved instances, with two auxiliary parameters (namely 푟 and 푎; see,
e.g., (3) and (4)) instead of just one. On the one hand, this increases the complexity of the solution, which
now has to be expressed in an implicit way via the aforementioned optimization programme (NLP).
But at the same time, fine-tuning the optimal choice of that variable allows us to (provably) push our
technique to its limits. Finally, let us mention that, for a small number of machines (푛 = 3, 4, 5) we
get 푟 = 1/푎 in an optimal choice of parameters. Under 푟 = 1/푎, we end up with 푎 as the only free
parameter, and our construction becomes closer to that of [CKV09, KV13]; in fact, for 3 machines it
is essentially the same construction as in [CKV09] (which explains why we recover the same lower
bound). However, for 푛 ≥ 6 machines we need a more delicate choice of 푟 .
2 Notation and Preliminaries
Before we go into the construction of our lower bound (Section 3), we use this section to introduce basic
notation and recall the notions of mechanism, truthfulness, monotonicity, and approximation ratio. We
also provide a technical tool (Lemma 1) that is a consequence of weak monotonicity (Theorem 1); this
lemma will be used several times in the proof of our main result.
2.1 Unrelated Machine Scheduling
In the unrelated machine scheduling setting, we have a number 푛 of machines and a number 푚 of
tasks to allocate to these machines. These tasks can be performed in any order, and each task has to
be assigned to exactly one machine; machine 푖 requires 푡푖푗 units of time to process task 푗 . Hence, the
complete description of a problem instance can be given by a 푛 ×푚 cost matrix of the values 푡푖푗 , which
we denote by 풕. In this matrix, row 푖, denoted by 풕푖 , represents the processing times for machine 푖
(on the different tasks) and column 푗 , denoted by 풕푗 , represents the processing times for task 푗 (on the
different machines). These values 푡푖푗 are assumed to be nonnegative real quantities, 푡푖푗 ∈ ℝ+.
Applying the methodology of mechanism design, we assume that the processing times for machine
푖 are known only by machine 푖 herself. Moreover, machines are selfish agents; in particular, they are
not interested in running a task unless they receive some compensation for doing so. They may also
lie about their processing times if this would benefit them. This leads us to consider the central notion
of (direct-revelation) mechanisms: each machine reports her values, and a mechanism decides on an
allocation of tasks to machines, as well as corresponding payments, based on the reported values.
Definition 1 (Allocation rule, payment rule, mechanism). Given 푛 machines and 푚 tasks,
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• a (deterministic) allocation rule is a function that describes the allocation of tasks to machines
for each problem instance. Formally, it is represented as a function 풂 ∶ ℝ푛×푚+ → {0, 1}푛×푚 such
that, for every 풕 = (푡푖푗 ) ∈ ℝ푛×푚+ and every task 푗 = 1,… , 푚, there is exactly one machine 푖 with푎푖푗 (풕) = 1, that is,
푛∑
푖=1
푎푖푗 (풕) = 1; (1)
• a payment rule is a function that describes the payments to machines for each problem instance.
Formally, it is represented as a function 푝 ∶ ℝ푛×푚+ → ℝ푛;
• a (direct-revelation, deterministic)mechanism is a pair (풂, 푝) consisting of an allocation and pay-
ment rules.
We let 픸 denote the set of feasible allocations, that is, matrices 풂 = (푎푖푗 ) ∈ {0, 1}푛×푚 satisfying (1).
Given a feasible allocation 풂, we let 풂푖 denote its row 푖, that is, the allocation to machine 푖. Similarly,
given a payment vector 풑 ∈ ℝ푛, we let 푝푖 denote the payment to machine 푖; note that the payments rep-
resent an amount of money given to the machine, which is somewhat the opposite situation compared
to other mechanism design frameworks (such as auctions, where payments are done by the agents to
the mechanism designer).
2.2 Truthfulness and Monotonicity
Whenever a mechanism assigns an allocation 풂푖 and a payment 푝푖 to machine 푖, this machine incurs a
quasi-linear utility equal to her payment minus the sum of processing times of the tasks allocated to
her,
푢푖 = 푝푖 − 풂푖 ⋅ 풕푖 = 푝푖 −
푚∑
푗=1
푎푖푗 푡푖푗 .
Note that the above quantity depends on the machine’s true processing times, which in principle
might differ from the reported processing times. As already explained, machines behave selfishly. Thus,
from the point of view of amechanism designer, wewish to ensure a predictable behaviour of all parties
involved. In particular, we are only interested inmechanisms that encourage agents to report their true
valuations.
Definition 2 (Truthful mechanism). A mechanism (풂, 푝) is truthful if every machine maximizes their
utility by reporting truthfully, regardless of the reports by the other machines. Formally, for every
machine 푖, every 풕푖 , 풕′푖 ∈ ℝ푚+ , 풕−푖 ∈ 푅(푛−1)×푚+ , we have that
푝푖(풕푖 , 풕−푖) − 풂푖(풕푖 , 풕−푖) ⋅ 풕푖 ≥ 푝푖(풕′푖 , 풕−푖) − 풂푖(풕′푖 , 풕−푖) ⋅ 풕푖 . (TR)
In (TR), we “freeze” the reports of all machines other than 푖. The left hand side corresponds to the
utility achieved by machine 푖 when her processing times correspond to 풕푖 and she truthfully reports 풕푖 .
The right hand side corresponds to the utility achieved if machine 푖 lies and reports 풕′푖 .
The most important example of a truthful mechanism in this setting is the VCG mechanism that
assigns each task independently to the machine that can perform it faster, and paying that machine
(for that task) a value equal to the second-lowest processing time. Note that this is somewhat the
equivalent of second-price auctions (that sell each item independently) for the scheduling setting.
A fundamental result in the theory of mechanism design is the very useful property of truthful
mechanisms, in terms of “local” monotonicity of the allocation function with respect to single-machine
deviations.
Theorem 1 (Weak monotonicity [NR01, LS09]). Let 풕 be a cost matrix, 푖 be a machine, and 풕′푖 another
report from machine 푖. Let 풂푖 be the allocation of 푖 for cost matrix 풕 and 풂′푖 be the allocation of 푖 for cost
matrix (풕′푖 , 풕−푖). Then, if the mechanism is truthful, it must be that
(풂푖 − 풂
′
푖 ) ⋅ (풕푖 − 풕
′
푖 ) ≤ 0. (WMON)
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As a matter of fact, (WMON) is also a sufficient condition for truthfulness, thus providing an exact
characterization of truthfulness [SY05]. However, for our purposes in this paper we will only need the
direction in the statement of Theorem 1 as stated above. We will make use of the following lemma,
which exploits the notion of weak monotonicity in a straightforward way. The second part of this
lemma can be understood as a refinement of a technical lemma that appeared before in [CKV09, Lemma
2] (see also [KV13, Lemma 1]).
Lemma 1. Suppose that machine 푖 changes her report from 풕 to 풕′, and that a truthful mechanism corre-
spondingly changes her allocation from 풂푖 to 풂
′
푖 . Let {1,… , 푚} = 푆 ∪ 푇 ∪ 푉 be a partition of the tasks into
three disjoint sets.
1. Suppose that (a) the valuation of 푖 on 푉 does not change, that is, 풕푖,푉 = 풕′푖,푉 and (b) the allocation of푖 on 푆 does not change, that is, 풂푖,푆 = 풂′푖,푆 . Then
(풂푖,푇 − 풂′푖,푇 ) ⋅ (풕푖,푇 − 풕′푖,푇 ) ≤ 0.
2. Suppose additionally that (c) the valuation of 푖 strictly decreases on her allocated tasks in 푇 and
strictly increases on her unallocated tasks in 푇 . Then her allocation on 푇 does not change, that is,
풂푖,푇 = 풂′푖,푇 .
Proof. To prove the first point, simply apply (WMON) and split the sum into the three sets of tasks,
0 ≥ (풂푖 − 풂′푖 ) ⋅ (풕푖 − 풕′푖 )
= (풂푖,푆 − 풂′푖,푆) ⋅ (풕푖,푆 − 풕′푖,푆) + (풂푖,푇 − 풂′푖,푇 ) ⋅ (풕푖,푇 − 풕′푖,푇 ) + (풂푖,푉 − 풂′푖,푉 ) ⋅ (풕푖,푉 − 풕′푖,푉 );
since 풕푖,푉 = 풕′푖,푉 and 풂푖,푆 = 풂′푖,푆 , the result follows.
To prove the second point, we look at each term appearing in the inner product (풂푖,푇 − 풂′푖,푇 ) ⋅ (풕푖,푇 −
풕′푖,푇 ). Let 푗 ∈ 푇 be a task which was originally allocated to machine 푖; then, 푎푖,푗 = 1 and, by assumption,푡푖,푗 > 푡′푖,푗 . Since 푎′푖,푗 is either 1 or 0, it follows that (푎푖,푗 − 푎′푖,푗)(푡푖,푗 − 푡′푖,푗 ) is either 0 (if the allocation does
not change) or 푡푖,푗 − 푡′푖,푗 > 0 (if the allocation changes). Similarly, assume now that 푗 ∈ 푇 was originally
not allocated to machine 푖; then, 푎푖,푗 = 0 and, by assumption, 푡푖,푗 < 푡′푖,푗 . Since 푎′푖,푗 is either 0 or 1, it
follows that (푎푖,푗 − 푎′푖,푗 )(푡푖,푗 − 푡′푖,푗) is either 0 (if the allocation does not change) or (−1) × (푡푖,푗 − 푡′푖,푗) > 0
(if the allocation changes). By the first point, the sum over all these terms must be non-positive. We
conclude that all these terms must be zero, and hence, the allocation of machine 푖 for tasks on 푇 must
not change.
2.3 Approximation ratio
One of the main open question in the theory of mechanism design is to figure out what is the “best”
possible truthful mechanism. The long-standing conjecture by Nisan and Ronen [NR01] states that
this is essentially the VCG mechanism; if our objective is to minimize the makespan, then any truthful
mechanism is believed to attain a worst-case approximation ratio of 푛, the number of machines (for
sufficiently many tasks).
Definition 3. Given 푛 machines and 푚 tasks:
• Let 풂 be a feasible allocation and 풕 a problem instance. The makespan of 풂 on 풕 is defined as the
quantity
makespan(풂, 풕) = max푖=1,…,푛
푚∑
푗=1
푎푖푗 푡푖푗 .
• Let 풕 be a problem instance. The optimal makespan is defined as the quantity
OPT(풕) = min
풂∈픸 makespan(풂, 풕).
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• Let 풂 be an allocation rule. We say that 풂 has approximation ratio 휌 ≥ 1 if, for any problem
instance 풕, we have that
makespan(풂(풕), 풕) ≤ 휌 OPT(풕);
if no such quantity 휌 exists, we say that 풂 has infinite approximation ratio.
As already explained, the VCG mechanism can be seen to have an approximation ratio of 푛. In
this paper, we prove lower bounds on the approximation ratio of any truthful mechanism (Table 1
and Theorem 2); our bounds converge to 2.755 as 푛 → ∞.
3 Lower Bound
To prove our lower bound, from here on we assume 푛 ≥ 3 machines, since the case 푛 = 1 is trivial
and the case 푛 = 2 is resolved by [NR99] (with an approximation ratio of 2). Our construction will be
made with the choice of two parameters 푟, 푎. For now we shall simply assume that 푎 > 1 > 푟 > 0.
Later we will optimize the choices of 푟 and 푎 in order to achieve the best lower bound possible by our
construction.
We will use 퐿푛 to denote the 푛 × 푛 matrix with 0 in its diagonal and ∞ elsewhere,
퐿푛 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 ∞ ⋯ ∞
∞ 0 ⋯ ∞
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
∞ ∞ ⋯ 0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
We should mention here that allowing 푡푖푗 = ∞ is a technical convenience. If only finite values are
allowed, we can replace ∞ by an arbitrarily high value. We also follow the usual convention, and use
an asterisk ∗ to denote a full or partial allocation. Our lower bound begins with the following cost
matrix for 푛 machines and 2푛 − 1 tasks:
퐴0 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
퐿푛
∗1 1 푎−1 푎−2 ⋯ 푎−푛+3
1 1 푎−1 푎−2 ⋯ 푎−푛+3
∞ 1 ∞ ∞ ⋯ ∞
∞ ∞ 푎−1 ∞ ⋯ ∞
∞ ∞ ∞ 푎−2 ⋱ ∞
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋱ ⋮
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ⋯ 푎−푛+3
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
. (2)
The tasks of cost matrix 퐴0 can be partitioned in two groups. The first 푛 tasks (i.e., the ones corre-
sponding to the 퐿푛 submatrix) will be called dummy tasks. Machine 푖 has a cost of 0 for dummy task 푖
and a cost of ∞ for all other dummy tasks. The second group of tasks, numbered 푛 + 1,… , 2푛 − 1, will
be called proper tasks. Notice that machines 1 and 2 have the same costs for proper tasks; they both
need time 1 to execute task 푛 + 1 and time 푎−푗+2 to execute task 푛 + 푗 , for all 푗 = 2,… 푛 − 1. Finally for
푖 ≥ 3, machine 푖 has a cost of 푎−푖+3 on proper task 푛 + 푖 − 1 and ∞ cost for all other proper tasks.
In order for a mechanism to have a finite approximation ratio, it must not assign any tasks with
unbounded costs. In particular, each dummy task must be assigned to the unique machine that com-
pletes it in time 0; and proper task 푛 + 1 must be assigned to either machine 1 or 2. Since the costs of
machines 1 and 2 are the same on all proper tasks, we can without loss assume that machine 1 receives
proper task 푛 + 1. Hence, the allocation on 퐴0 should be as (designated by an asterisk) in (2).
Next, we reduce the costs of all proper tasks for machine 1, and get the cost matrix
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퐴1 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
퐿푛
푟 푎−1 푎−2 푎−3 ⋯ 푎−푛+2
1 1 푎−1 푎−2 ⋯ 푎−푛+3
∞ 1 ∞ ∞ ⋯ ∞
∞ ∞ 푎−1 ∞ ⋯ ∞
∞ ∞ ∞ 푎−2 ⋱ ∞
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋱ ⋮
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ⋯ 푎−푛+3
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
. (3)
Under the new matrix 퐴1, the cost of machine 1 for proper task 푛 + 1 is reduced from 1 to 푟 ; and her
cost for any other proper task 푛 + 푗 , 푗 = 2,… , 푛 − 1, is reduced by a factor of 푎, that is, from 푎−푗+2 to
푎−푗+1. The key idea in this step is the following: we want to impose a constraint on 푟 and 푎 that ensures
that at least one of the proper tasks 푛 + 1, 푛 + 2 is still allocated to machine 1. Using the properties of
truthfulness, this can be achieved via the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Consider a truthful scheduling mechanism that, on cost matrix 퐴0, assigns proper task 푛 + 1
to machine 1. Suppose also that
1 − 푟 > 푎−1 − 푎−푛+2. (4)
Then, on cost matrix 퐴1, machine 1 must receive at least one of the proper tasks 푛 + 1, 푛 + 2.
Proof. We apply part 1 of Lemma 1, taking 푆 = ∅, 푉 as the set of dummy tasks, and 푇 as the set of
proper tasks. If 풂1, 풂′1 denote the allocations of machine 1 for cost matrices 퐴0, 퐴1 respectively, we get
that
(풂1,푇 − 풂′1,푇 ) ⋅ (풕1,푇 − 풕′1,푇 ) ≤ 0.
Assume further, for the sake of obtaining a contradiction, that on cost matrix 퐴1, machine 1 does not
get either task 푛 + 1 or 푛 + 2; that is, 푎′1,푛+1 = 푎′1,푛+2 = 0. Notice that 푎1,푛+1 = 1 (since machine 1 gets
task 푛 + 1 on cost matrix 퐴0) and we have the lower bounds 푎1,푛+2 ≥ 0 as well as 푎1,푛+푗 − 푎′1,푛+푗 ≥ −1 for푗 = 3,… , 푛 − 1. Combining all these, we get
0 ≥ (풂1,푇 − 풂′1,푇 ) ⋅ (풕1,푇 − 풕′1,푇 )
= (푎1,푛+1 − 푎′1,푛+1)(푡1,푛+1 − 푡′1,푛+1) + (푎1,푛+2 − 푎′1,푛+2)(푡1,푛+2 − 푡′1,푛+2)
+ (푎1,푛+3 − 푎′1,푛+3)(푡1,푛+3 − 푡′1,푛+3) + … + (푎1,2푛−1 − 푎′1,2푛−1)(푡1,2푛−1 − 푡′1,2푛−1)
≥ 1 ⋅ (1 − 푟) + 0 ⋅ (1 − 푎−1) + (−1) ⋅ (푎−1 − 푎−2) + … + (−1) ⋅ (푎−푛+3 − 푎−푛+2)
= 1 − 푟 − 푎−1 + 푎−푛+2,
where in the last step we observe that the terms for tasks 푛+3,… , 2푛−1 form a telescoping sum. Thus,
we obtain that 1 − 푟 ≤ 푎−1 − 푎−푛+2, which contradicts our original assumption (4).
For the remainder of our construction, we assume that 푟 and 푎 are such that (4) is satisfied. Next,
we split the analysis depending on the allocation of the proper tasks 푛 + 1,…2푛 − 1 to machine 1 on
cost matrix 퐴1, as dictated by Lemma 2.
3.1 Case 1: Machine 1 gets all proper tasks
In this case, we perform the following changes in machine’s 1 tasks, obtaining a new cost matrix 퐵1.
We increase the cost of dummy task 1, from 0 to 1, and we decrease the cost of all her proper tasks by
an arbitrarily small amount. Notice that
• for the mechanism to achieve a finite approximation ratio, it must still allocate the dummy task
1 to machine 1;
• given that the mechanism does not change the allocation on dummy task 1, and that machine 1
only decreases the completion times of her proper tasks, part 2 of Lemma 1 implies that machine
1 still gets all proper tasks.
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Thus, the allocation must be as shown below (for ease of exposition, in the cost matrices that follow
we omit the “arbitrarily small’ amounts by which we change allocated / unallocated tasks):
퐵1 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
∗1 ∞ ∞ ∞ ⋯ ∞ ∗푟 ∗푎−1 ∗푎−2 ⋯ ∗푎−푛+2
∞ ∗0 ∞ ∞ ⋯ ∞ 1 1 푎−1 ⋯ 푎−푛+3
∞ ∞ ∗0 ∞ ⋯ ∞ ∞ 1 ∞ ⋯ ∞
∞ ∞ ∞ ∗0 ⋯ ∞ ∞ ∞ 푎−1 ⋯ ∞
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ⋯ ∗0 ∞ ∞ ∞ ⋯ 푎−푛+3
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
This allocation achieves a makespan of 1 + 푟 + 푎−1 + … + 푎−푛+2, while a makespan of 1 can be achieved
by assigning each proper task 푛 + 푗 to machine 푗 + 1. Hence, this case yields an approximation ratio of
at least 1 + 푟 + 푎−1 + … + 푎−푛+2.
3.2 Case 2: Machine 1 gets task 푛 + 1, but does not get all proper tasks.
That is, at least one of tasks 푛 + 2,…2푛 − 1 is not assigned to machine 1. Suppose that task 푛 + 푗 is the
lowest indexed proper task that is not allocated to her. We decrease the costs of her allocated proper
tasks 푛 + 1,… , 푛 + 푗 − 1 to 0, while increasing the costs of the (unallocated) proper task 푛 + 푗 by an
arbitrarily small amount. By Lemma 1, the allocation of machine 1 on the proper tasks 푛 + 1,… , 푛 + 푗
does not change. Hence we get a cost matrix of the form
퐵2 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
퐿푛
∗0 ∗0 ⋯ 푎−푗+1 ⋯ 푎−푛+2
1 1 ⋯ 푎−푗+2 ⋯ 푎−푛+3
∞ 1 ⋯ ∞ ⋯ ∞
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮ ⋯ ∞
∞ ∞ ⋯ 푎−푗+2 ⋱ ∞
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋱ ⋮
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ⋯ 푎−푛+3
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
Since task 푛 + 푗 is not allocated to machine 1, and the mechanism has finite approximation ratio,
it must be allocated to either machine 2 or machine 푗 + 1. In either case, we increase the cost of the
dummy task of this machine from 0 to 푎−푗+1, while decreasing the cost of her proper task 푛 + 푗 by an
arbitrarily small amount. For example, if machine 2 got task 푛 + 푗 , we would end up with
퐶2 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
∗0 ∞ ∞ ⋯ ∞ ⋯ ∞ 0 0 ⋯ 푎−푗+1 ⋯ 푎−푛+2
∞ ∗푎−푗+1 ∞ ⋯ ∞ ⋯ ∞ 1 1 ⋯ ∗푎−푗+2 ⋯ 푎−푛+3
∞ ∞ ∗0 ⋯ ∞ ⋯ ∞ ∞ 1 ⋯ ∞ ⋯ ∞
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮ ⋱ ∞
∞ ∞ ∞ ⋯ ∗0 ⋯ ∞ ∞ ∞ ⋯ 푎−푗+2 ⋯ ∞
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
∞ ∞ ∞ ⋯ ∞ ⋯ ∗0 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ⋯ 푎−푛+3
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
Similarly to the previous Case 1, the mechanismmust still allocate the dummy task to this machine,
and given that the allocation does not change on the dummy task, Lemma 1 implies that the allocation
must also remain unchanged on the proper task 푛 + 푗 . Finally, observe that the present allocation
achieves a makespan of at least 푎−푗+1 + 푎−푗+2, while a makespan of 푎−푗+1 can be achieved by assigning
proper task 푛 + 푗 to machine 1 and proper task 푛 + 푗′ to machine 푗′ + 1, for 푗′ > 푗 . Hence, this case yields
an approximation ratio of at least
푎−푗+1 + 푎−푗+2
푎−푗+1 = 1 + 푎. (5)
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3.3 Case 3: Machine 1 does not get task 푛 + 1
By Lemma 2, machine 1 must receive proper task 푛 + 2. In this case, we decrease the cost of her task
푛+2, from 푎−1 to 0, while increasing the completion times of her (unallocated) task 푛+1 by an arbitrarily
small amount. Since by truthfulness, the allocation of machine 1 does not change, the allocation must
be as below:
퐵3 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
퐿푛
푟 ∗0 푎−2 ⋯ 푎−푛+2
∗1 1 푎−1 ⋯ 푎−푛+3
∞ 1 ∞ ⋯ ∞
∞ ∞ 푎−1 ⋯ ∞
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
∞ ∞ ∞ ⋯ 푎−푛+3
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
Since task 푛 + 1 is not allocated to machine 1, and the mechanism has finite approximation ratio, it
must be allocated to machine 2. We now increase the cost of the dummy task of machine 2 from 0 to
max{푟, 푎−1}, while decreasing the cost of her proper task 푛+1 by an arbitrarily small amount. Similarly
to Cases 1 and 2, the mechanism must still allocate the dummy task to machine 2, and preserve the
allocation of machine 2 on the proper task 푛 + 1. Thus, we get the allocation shown below:
퐶3 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
∗0 ∞ ∞ ∞ ⋯ ∞ 푟 0 푎−2 ⋯ 푎−푛+2
∞ ∗max{푟, 푎−1} ∞ ∞ ⋯ ∞ ∗1 1 푎−1 ⋯ 푎−푛+3
∞ ∞ ∗0 ∞ ⋯ ⋮ ∞ 1 ∞ ⋯ ∞
∞ ∞ ∞ ∗0 ⋯ ∞ ∞ ∞ 푎−1 ⋯ ∞
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ⋯ ∗0 ∞ ∞ ∞ ⋯ 푎−푛+3
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
This allocation achieves a makespan of at least 1 + max{푟, 푎−1}, while a makespan of max{푟, 푎−1} can
be achieved by assigning proper tasks 푛 + 1, 푛 + 2 to machine 1 and proper task 푛 + 푗′ to machine 푗′ + 1,
for all 푗′ > 2. Hence, this case yields an approximation ratio of at least
1 + max{푟, 푎−1}
max{푟, 푎−1} = 1 + min{푟
−1, 푎}.
3.4 Main result
The three cases considered above give rise to possibly different approximation ratios; our construction
will then yield a lower bound equal to the smallest of these ratios. First notice that Case 3 always gives
a worse bound than Case 2: the approximation ratio for the former is 1 + min{푟−1, 푎}, whereas for the
latter is 1 + 푎. Thus we only have to consider the minimum between Cases 1 and 3.
Our goal then is to find a choice of 푟 and 푎 that achieves the largest possible such value. We can
formulate this as a nonlinear optimization problem on the variables 푟 and 푎. To simplify the exposition,
we also consider an auxiliary variable 휌, which will be set to the minimum of the approximation ratios:
휌 = min{1 + 푟 + 푎−1 + … + 푎−푛+2, 1 + min{푟−1, 푎}} = min{1 + 푟 + 푎−1 + … + 푎−푛+2, 1 + 푟−1, 1 + 푎} .
This can be enforced by the constraints 휌 ≤ 1 + 푟 + 푎−1 +… + 푎−푛+2, 휌 ≤ 1 + 푟−1 and 휌 ≤ 1 + 푎. Thus, our
optimization problem becomes
sup 휌 (NLP)
s.t. 휌 ≤ 1 + 푟 + 푎−1 + … + 푎−푛+2
휌 ≤ 1 + 푟−1
휌 ≤ 1 + 푎
9
0 < 푟 < 1 < 푎
1 − 푟 > 푎−1 − 푎−푛+2
Notice that any feasible solution of (NLP) gives rise to a lower bound on the approximation ratio of
truthful machine scheduling. In our next lemma, we characterize the limiting optimal solution of the
above optimization problem. Thus, the lower bound achieved corresponds to the best possible lower
bound using the general construction in this paper.
Lemma 3. An optimal solution to the optimization problem given by (NLP) is as follows.
1. For 푛 = 3, 4, 5, choose 휌 = 1 + 푎, 푟 = 1푎 , and 푎 as the positive solution of the equation
2
푎 = 푎, for 푛 = 3;
2
푎 +
1
푎2 = 푎, for 푛 = 4;
2
푎 +
1
푎2 +
1
푎3 = 푎, for 푛 = 5.
2. For 푛 ≥ 6, choose 휌 = 1 + 푎, 푟 = 1 − 1푎 + 1푎푛−2 , and 푎 as the positive solution of the equation
1 +
1
푎2 +⋯ +
1
푎푛−3 +
2
푎푛−2 = 푎. (6)
We defer the (admittedly technical) proof of Lemma 3 to Section 3.5 below; for the time being, we
show how this lemma allows us to prove our main result.
Theorem 2. No deterministic truthful mechanism for unrelated machine scheduling can have an approx-
imation ratio better than 휌 ≈ 2.755, where 휌 is the (unique real) solution of equation
(휌 − 1)(휌 − 2)2 = 1. (7)
For a restricted number of machines the lower bounds can be seen in Table 1.
Proof. For 푛 large enough we can use Case 2 of Lemma 3. In particular, taking the limit of (6) as 푛 → ∞,
we can ensure a lower bound of 휌 = 푎 + 1, where 푎 is the (unique) real solution of equation
1 +
∞∑
푖=2
1
푎푖 = 1 +
1
푎(푎 − 1) = 푎.
Performing the transformation 푎 = 휌−1, andmultiplying throughout by (휌−1)(휌−2), we get exactly (7).
For a fixed number of machines 푛, we can directly solve the equations given by either Case 1
(푛 = 3, 4, 5) or Case 2 of Lemma 3 to derive the corresponding value of 푎, for a lower bound of 휌 = 푎+1.
In particular, for 푛 = 3, 4, 5 one gets 푎 = √2 ≈ 1.414, 푎 = 휙 ≈ 1.618 (i.e., the golden ratio) and 푎 ≈ 1.711,
respectively. The values of 휌 for up to 푛 = 8 machines are given in Table 1.
3.5 Proof of Lemma 3
For the remainder of the paper we focus on proving Lemma 3, that is, we characterize the limiting
optimal solution of (NLP). We begin by introducing a new variable 푧 = 푎−1, and restate the problem in
terms of 푟, 푧, 휌.
sup 휌 (8)
s.t. 휌 ≤ 1 + 푟 + 푧 + … + 푧푛−2
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휌 ≤ 1 + 푟−1
휌 ≤ 1 + 푧−1
0 < 푟, 푧 < 1
푟 < 1 − 푧 + 푧푛−2
Notice that the function (푟, 푧) ↦ min{1 + 푟 + 푧 +…+ 푧푛−2, 1 + 푟−1, 1 + 푧−1}, defined in the feasibility
domain 퐷 = {(푟, 푧) ∶ 0 < 푟, 푧 < 1 and 푟 < 1 − 푧 + 푧푛−2}, has a continuous extension to the closure
퐷̄ = {(푟, 푧) ∶ 0 ≤ 푟, 푧 ≤ 1 and 푟 ≤ 1 − 푧 + 푧푛−2}, which is a compact set. By the extreme value theorem,
the continuous extension must achieve its supremum at some point in 퐷̄; that is to say, the supremum
of (8) corresponds to the maximum of the relaxed problem,
max 휌
s.t. 휌 ≤ 1 + 푟 + 푧 + … + 푧푛−2
휌 ≤ 1 + 푟−1
휌 ≤ 1 + 푧−1
0 ≤ 푟, 푧 ≤ 1
푟 ≤ 1 − 푧 + 푧푛−2 (9)
which always exist.
Let (푟, 푧, 휌) be an optimal solution. Our next step is to prove that 휌 = 1 + 푧−1. Suppose otherwise;
then, since 휌 = min{1 + 푟 + 푧 + … + 푧푛−2, 1 + 푟−1, 1 + 푧−1}, one must have that either
1 + 푟 + 푧 + … + 푧푛−2 < 1 + 푧−1 or 1 + 푟−1 < 1 + 푧−1. (10)
We will show that, under such circumstances, we could find a perturbed (푟̃ , 푧̃, 휌̃) with a strictly
better objective value, thus yielding a contradiction. Our analysis proceeds in three cases.
Case 1: 푟 = 0. This implies that 1 + 푟−1 = ∞, and thus 휌 = 1 + 푟 + 푧 + … + 푧푛−2 < 1 + 푧−1 ≤ 1 + 푟−1
Also, since 1 − 푧 + 푧푛−2 > 0 for 0 ≤ 푧 ≤ 1, (9) is not tight, that is to say, 푟 < 1 − 푧 + 푧푛−2. Thus, we can
increase 푟 by an arbitrarily small 휀 > 0, thus yielding a feasible solution (푟 + 휀, 푧, 휌 + 휀) with a strictly
better objective value.
Case 2: 푟 > 0 and 푧 = 1. This cannot occur, since it would imply both
1 + 푟 + 푧 + … + 푧푛−2 ≥ 1 + 푧−1 and 1 + 푟−1 ≥ 1 + 푧−1,
which would contradict (10).
Case 3: 푟 > 0 and 푧 < 1. Take 휀 > 0 sufficiently small and perturb (푟, 푧) to a new pair (푟 − 휀, 푧 + 휀),
so that 푟 − 휀 > 0, 푧 + 휀 < 1, and (10) remains valid. Notice that, under this perturbation, 푟 decreases, 푧
increases, and 푟+푧 remains constant. Hence, we do not leave the feasibility region; in particular, (9) can
be written as 푟 + 푧 ≤ 1 + 푧푛−2, and this inequality can only remain valid after the perturbation. Finally,
the perturbation increases both left-hand sides and decreases both right-hand sides of (10). Therefore,
the perturbed (푟̃ , 푧̃) gives rise to a strictly better objective value.
We have thus deduced that 휌 = 1 + 푧−1 in an optimal solution. This allows us to restate the opti-
mization problem,
max 1 + 푧−1
s.t. 1 + 푧−1 ≤ 1 + 푟 + 푧 + … + 푧푛−2
1 + 푧−1 ≤ 1 + 푟−1
0 ≤ 푟, 푧 ≤ 1
푟 ≤ 1 − 푧 + 푧푛−2
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Further rearranging, and removing unnecessary inequalities, yields
max 1 + 푧−1
s.t. 푟 ≥ 푧−1 − 푧 − … − 푧푛−2
푟 ≥ 0
푟 ≤ 푧
푟 ≤ 1 − 푧 + 푧푛−2
0 ≤ 푧 ≤ 1
Next observe that we can remove the dependency on 푟 by setting 푟 = min{푧, 1 − 푧 + 푧푛−2}, as long as a
feasible choice of 푟 exists. Thus, we end up with
max 1 + 푧−1
s.t. 푧−1 − 푧 − … − 푧푛−2 ≤ 푧 (11)
푧−1 − 푧 − … − 푧푛−2 ≤ 1 − 푧 + 푧푛−2 (12)
0 ≤ 푧 ≤ 1
0 ≤ 1 − 푧 + 푧푛−2 (13)
Notice that (13) is redundant from 0 ≤ 푧 ≤ 1, and can be removed. Also, we can rewrite (11) and
(12) as
푧−1 ≤ 2푧 + 푧2 + … + 푧푛−3 + 푧푛−2, 푧−1 ≤ 1 + 푧2 + … + 푧푛−3 + 2푧푛−2.
In both of the above inequalities, the left hand side is decreasing in 푧, from ∞ as 푧 → 0 to 1 at 푧 = 1,
whereas the right hand side is increasing in 푧, from either 0 or 1 at 푧 = 0 to 푛 − 1 at 푧 = 1. Hence, there
are unique positive solutions 푧푛,1, 푧푛,2 to the equations
푧−1 = 2푧 + 푧2 + … + 푧푛−3 + 푧푛−2;
푧−1 = 1 + 푧2 + … + 푧푛−3 + 2푧푛−2;
and moreover, (11), (12) are equivalent to 푧 ≥ 푧푛,1, 푧 ≥ 푧푛,2 respectively. Since 푧 = 1 is a valid feasible
point, we also get that 0 < 푧푛,1, 푧푛,2 < 1. Since our goal is to maximize 1+ 푧−1, this is obtained by taking
푧 to be the maximum of 푧푛,1, 푧푛,2.
We can finally convert back to 푎 = 푧−1. Since 0 < 푧 < 1, 1 < 푎 < ∞. We recover 푟 via 푟 =
min{푧, 1 − 푧 + 푧푛−2} = min{푎−1, 1 − 푎−1 + 푎−푛+2}. Also, the reciprocals of 푧푛,1, 푧푛,2 correspond to the
unique positive solutions 푎푛,1, 푎푛,2 to the equations
푎 = 2푎−1 + 푎−2 + … + 푎−푛+2; (14)
푎 = 1 + 푎−2 + … + 푎−푛+3 + 2푎−푛+2; (15)
and the maximum of 푧푛,1, 푧푛,2 corresponds to the minimum of 푎푛,1, 푎푛,2.
Now, for 푛 = 3, 4, 5, one can numerically check that 푎푛,1 < 푎푛,2: we have
푎3,1 ≈ 1.414 푎4,1 ≈ 1.618 푎5,1 ≈ 1.711
푎3,2 ≈ 1.618 푎4,2 ≈ 1.696 푎5,2 ≈ 1.725
Thus, for 푛 = 3, 4, 5, the optimal solution corresponds to taking 푎 such that 푎 = 2푎−1+푎−2+…+푎−푛+2; and
therefore, (11) is tight, so that 푟 = 푎−1. On the other hand, for 푛 = 6, we have 푎푛,1 ≈ 1.755 > 1.739 ≈ 푎푛,2;
and moreover, as we increment 푛, the right hand side of (14) increases by an extra term 푎−푛+2 whereas
the right hand side of (15) increases by 2푎−푛+2 −푎−푛+3 = 푎−푛+2(2−푎), which is nonnegative: by plugging
푎 = 2 in (15) we see that 푎푛,2 < 2. Hence, the sequences 푎푛,1 and 푎푛,2 are both increasing, and in
particular 푎푛,2 converges to some value 푎∞,2 which is the solution of
푎 = 1 + ∞∑
푖=2
1
푎푖 = 1 +
1
푎(푎 − 1) .
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We can directly check that 푎∞,2 = 푎6,1 ≈ 1.755, by comparing the respective equations:
푎∞,2 = 1 + 1푎∞,2(푎∞,2 − 1) ⇒ 푎∞,2(푎∞,2 − 1)
2 = 1
⇒ 푎3∞,2 − 2푎2∞,2 + 푎∞,2 − 1 = 0;
푎6,1 = 2푎−16,1 + 푎−26,1 + 푎−36,1 + 푎−46,1 ⇒ 푎56,1 − 2푎36,1 − 푎26,1 − 푎6,1 = 1
⇒ (푎36,1 − 2푎26,1 + 푎6,1 − 1)(푎6,1 + 1)2 = 0.
Thus, for 푛 ≥ 6, we have that 푎푛,2 < 푎∞,2 = 푎6,1 ≤ 푎푛,1. We conclude that the optimal solution cor-
responds to taking 푎 such that 푎 = 1 + 푎−2 + … + 푎−푛+3 + 2푎−푛+2; this means that (12) is tight, so that
푟 = 1 − 푎−1 + 푎−푛+2. This finishes the proof.
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